The hidden action model captures a fundamental problem of principal-agent theory and provides an optimal sharing rule when only the outcome but not the effort can be observed (Holmström, 1979) . However, the hidden action model builds on various explicit and also implicit assumptions about the information of the contracting parties. This paper relaxes key assumptions regarding the availability of information included the hidden action model in order to study whether and, if so, how fast the optimal sharing rule is achieved and how this is affected by the various types of information employed in the principal-agent relation. Our analysis particularly focuses on information about the environment and feasible actions for the agent to carry out the task. For this, we follow an approach to transfer closed-form mathematical models into agent-based computational models. The results show that the extent of information about feasible options to carry out a task only has an impact on performance, if decision makers are well informed about the environment, and that the decision whether to perform exploration or exploitation when searching for new feasible options only affects performance in specific situations. Having good information about the environment, in contrary, appears to be crucial in almost all situations.
Introduction
The analysis of economic exchanges lies in the core of the principal-agent framework: An individual (the principal, P) delegates some authority in order to act in her name to another individual (the agent, A). This relation is specified in a contract which defines what A has to do, in terms of a task which is delegated from P to A, and how the resulting outcome is shared between P and A (Lambert, 2001) . In a context of environmental uncertainty and incomplete information, principal-agent theory aims at finding the most efficient contract which aligns P's and A's interest while also maximizing P's utility (Eisenhardt, 1989a) . Hendry, 2002) .
In this paper, we shift the attention from the decision-influencing perspective to decisionfacilitating role of information. In particular, we focus on the assumptions related to decisionfacilitating information and analyze, whether a relaxation of the aforementioned assumptions results in modified requirements for the information which is relevant in the context of principal agent-relations. In particular, employing more realistic assumptions regarding the availability of decision-facilitating information could shift the attention from ex-post performance information to information systems which provide information about the environment or the set of feasible actions. Limiting P's and A's availability of decision-facilitating information will inevitably require to endow them with additional capabilities, such as learning mechanisms or the ability to search for information following different strategies, such as exploration or exploitation (March, 1991) .
There are some empirical findings supporting the conjecture that managerial decision-makers have particular requirements regarding these kinds of information: For example, Vandenbosch and Huff (1997) report on the use of executive information systems indicating that managers employ the systems to challenge general managerial assumptions and preconditions, e.g., related to the environment. Based on an empirical study, Schäffer and Steiners (2004) distinguish different forms of information usage indicating that ex post performance evaluation is just one of several relevant forms while according to Schäffer and Steiners (2005) managers are rather satisfied with accounting-based information but see some deficiencies with respect to information related to environment including, for example, competitors or probabilities of external events. In a similar vein, Hall (2010) argues that future developments in accounting should be directed to provide relevant information for a general understanding of the related field and for strategizing.
Against this background, our research endeavor employs an approach which allows for a relaxation (Guerrero and Axtell, 2011; Leitner and Behrens, 2015) of key assumptions regarding the availability of decision-facilitating information of the contracting parties in the standard hidden action model (Holmström, 1979) : We put a particular focus on the assumptions regarding (i) the availability of information about the environment and the assumption that (ii) both the principal and the agent are fully informed about the set of feasible actions to carry out the task which the principal delegates to the agent. In particular, we limit the availability of information (i) and (ii). We endow the principal and the agent to learn about (i) the environment over time: For the agent we carry over the assumption of the hidden action setup and endow him with the capability to observe realizations of the environments ex-post to their realization, while the principal is endowed with the ability to ex-post estimate the environmental variables. Both, P and A, have access to private information systems in which their learnings are stored. For (ii) the set of feasible actions we add information asymmetry: The agent is fully informed about feasible ways to carry out the delegated task. The principal, however, only has limited information about the set of feasible actions but is endowed the ability to either perform exploration or exploitation to overcome this information asymmetry. Both, P and A have private information systems from which information about the action space can be retrieved. The relaxation of assumptions reduces the model's mathematical tractability dramatically. We, therefore, set up an agent-based representation of the hidden action problem which includes the relaxed assumptions (for simulation-based approaches in managerial science see, for example, Davis et al., 2007; Leitner and Wall, 2015; Wall, 2016) .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the main features of the hidden action model introduced in Holmström (1979) and discusses the assumptions incorporated into it. In Sec. 3, we introduce the relaxed assumptions, discuss their operationalization, 3 and formalize the agent-based model. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of the simulation study. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper, discusses limitations and avenues for future research on this topic.
2. Information systems in the standard hidden action model
The hidden-action model in a nutshell
The standard hidden action model captures a single-period situation in which a principal P hires an agent A for carrying out a task. P, however, cannot observe (or assess at reasonable costs) the way the task is carried out but only observe the task's outcome. The standard hidden action model proposes an incentive scheme (i.e, a rule to share the task's outcome between P and A), which assures that A acts in the best interest of P, so that P's utility is maximized. Figure 1 represents the sequence of events within the standard hidden action model (Holmström, 1979) . 1 The task to be carried out, and a sharing rule s(·) are specified in a contract. In τ = 1, P designs the contract and offers it to A, who decides whether to accept it in τ = 2 . If A accepts the contract, in τ = 3 he exerts productive action (or effort) a ∈ A in order to carry out the task, where A represents the entire set of actions available for A. The action a is assumed to lead to (monetary) outcome x, which increases in a. It is a core assumption of the hidden-action model that P cannot observe a. In addition to the level of exerted effort, outcome x is affected by an exogenous factor θ ∈ Θ, which represents a random state of nature. The corresponding production function is formalized by x = X(a, θ) where δX/δa > 0. The exogenous factor θ realizes in τ = 4 and is not observable for P. The agent, however, can observe θ after the outcome x has realized (ex-post, in τ = 5) but has no information about the realization of θ from τ = 1 to τ = 4. Both parties are, however, assumed to have information about the distribution of Θ in every τ.
Both P and A are modeled to be individual utility maximizers. P's utility function is formalized by U P (x, s) = x − s(x), where s = s(x) represents A's share of outcome x. The compensation s only depends on outcome x, since this is the only piece of information available for P to base A's compensation on.
The agent is assumed to experience utility V(s) from compensation s, and disutility G(a) from exerting effort a. The model is restricted to agents' utility functions where these two components are additively separable, which allows to formalize the utility function by U A (s, a) = V(s)−G(a). While the principal may or may not be risk neutral, the agent is assumed to be risk averse. • that maximizes U P (x, s) taking into account that s(x) affects A's effort a via the outcome x, and that a leads to disutility for A, and
• that leads to a minimum level of utility U for A (referred to as reservation utlity).
In order to find a feasible solution to this problem, two additional constraints have to be considered:
1. The participation constraint E(U A (s, a)) ≥ U, which assures that A's utility is at least as high as the utility from A's best outside option (so that A decides to accept the contract in τ = 2), and 2. the incentive compatibility constraint a ∈ argmax a ∈A E(U A (s, a )), which aligns U P (x, s) and U A (s, a), so that for every sharing rule s(·), in τ = 3, the agent exerts the effort level a ∈ A which maximizes both A's and P's utility.
Information systems
The standard hidden action model in total captures (in parts implicitly) three types of information systems (ISs) (cf. Fig. 2 ). We distinguish between internal and external information. Internal information is produced (and can be affected) by organizations and captures, for example, information from planning systems or information about an organization's performance. External information refers to information about the environment. The following ISs are considered:
1. Information about the environment (provided by IS 1): P as well as A are modeled to be informed about the distribution of the exogenous factor Θ. This type of information covers all relevant issues outside the organization, such as information about competitors, resources, technology, economic conditions (Dumond, 1994) : P uses this information in τ = 1, when the contract is designed and s(·) is derived, while A uses this information in τ = 2 and τ = 3, when he decides whether to accept the contract and selects an effort level a, respectively.
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2. Information about the action space (provided by IS 2): In order to derive the optimal sharing rule in τ = 1, and in order to exert the utility maximizing effort level in τ = 3, both P and A have to have information about the entire action space A. This type of information can be retrieved from a system which provides internal information about the action space (such as a planning system). In order to come to the optimal compensation scheme s(·) and to find the optimal effort level a, both P and A are required to consider all relevant alternatives within the action space. Taking this for granted like in the standard hidden action model, is a rather 'heroic' assumption, as the specification of all feasible effort levels might be extremely difficult (Feltham, 1968 ). 3. Information about the outcome (provided by IS 3): In τ = 5 the standard model assumes P and A to observe the outcome x. In order to do so, they use an IS which also provides internal information. Figure 2 schematically represents ISs employed in the hidden action context. This paper focuses on the decision-facilitating role of information in hidden-action problems. For the remainder of the paper, we, thus, particularly stress the assumptions regarding the ISs which provide external information (IS 1) and internal information about the action space (IS 2). We do not focus on IS 3, as the type of information provided by this information systems is mainly used for decision-influencing purposes. It is also important to notice that the standard hidden action model assumes that the different types of ISs contain all the necessary pieces of information. For the model described above, this means that all required information is entered into ISs 1 and 2 before τ = 1.
3. The agent-based model variant 3.1. Relaxing assumptions regarding information systems 3.1.1. Assumptions regarding the IS which provides external information (IS 1) Relaxed Assumptions. Recall that the standard hidden-action model (Holmström, 1979) assumes that both P and A instantaneously have information about the distribution of the exogneous factor capturing the environment. From a decision-facilitating perspective this means, that P and A can immediately make the best possible decision. We adapt this assumption in the following way: We assume that 1. P and A no longer instantaneously have information about all possible realizations of environmental variables (including their probabilities) as it is assumed in the standard hidden action model. 2. P and A are endowed with the capability to individually learn about the environment (i.e., about the distribution of environmental variables) over time. We refer to the implemented learning model as simultaneous sequential learning. 3. P and A and can store their individually learned pieces of information IS 1-P and IS 1-A, respectively (cf. Fig. 3 ).
These are feasible adaptations of the standard model, as learning about the environment is a common feature of organizations: Epstein (2003) , for example, refers to it as a prerequisite for organizational well-being and survival (see also Daft and Weick, 1984; Guo and Reithel, 2018 Operationalization of relaxed assumptions. In order to operationalize these adaptations, we enrich the standard hidden-action model by a simultaneous and sequential learning model: We endow P with the ability to estimate the realizations of θ, which she stores in her private IS 1-P. P's learning mechanism is formalized in Sec. 3.2. For A we carry over the assumption of the standard hidden-action model, so that he is able to (ex-ante) observe the realizations of θ, which he stores in his private IS 1-A. For a schematic representation of the ISs cf. Fig. 3 .
Sophistication of IS 1-P and IS 1-A in the agent-based model variant. Our model considers different sophistication levels of the ISs which provide external information. The concept of sophistication of IS 1-P and IS 1-A can be related to prior research in two ways:
1. Guo and Reithel (2018) decompose information processing in organizations into two main categories, namely information inflow and information outflow. We capture the inflow of information about the environment into the IS by P and A entering their learnings (from the simultaneous sequential learning model) into the IS. As a prerequisite for information outflow, the collected information needs to be processed so that it can be used for decision making purposes. IS sophistication is referred to as the organization's capability to process information. 2. The concept of IS sophistication can also be related to the fit between the individual, the task to be carried out, and the IS providing information: Liu et al. (2011) decompose the task-technology fit model (which is originally introduced in Goodhue and Thompson, 1995) and argue that there are three two-way fits, namely the task-technology fit, the individual-technology fit, and the task-individual fit. The latter fit refers to the fit between individual capabilities and decision making requirements imposed by certain tasks. The individual-technology fit refers to the fit between characteristics of technologies and needs of individuals who are responsible for solving tasks, e.g., in terms of how information is provided. The task-technology fit refers to the fit between characteristics of technologies and the tasks to be carried out, e.g. in terms of providing good and appropriate information. We particularly focus on the task-technology fit.
We operationalize the sophistication of the ISs which provides external information as follows: More (less) sophisticated ISs comprise better (poor) information about the environment,whereby the lowest (highest) level of sophistication indicates that only very recent (all historical) data stored in the IS is processed and provided for decision making purposes.
Assumptions regarding the IS which provides internal information (IS 2)
Relaxed assumptions. The assumptions made in the standard model imply that there is one IS which comprises information about the set of feasible actions A, and that both P and A have the same information about the action space (cf. Fig. 2 ). Prior research, however, argues that information asymmetry lies in the heart of decentralization (Akerlof, 1970) , as decentralized decision makers (i.e., A in our model) are usually better informed than central managers or the owner of an organization (i.e, P in our model) (Rajan and Saouma, 2006) . In line with the argumentation in Akerlof (1970) we enrich the standard hidden action model with information asymmetry about the set of feasible actions between P and A, so that we allow for A being better informed about the action space than P.
Operationalization of relaxed assumptions. In order to introduce information asymmetry regarding A, we make the following adaptations of the standard hidden action model:
1. P and A no longer share one IS which contains information about the set of feasible actions but we model P and A to have separate ISs (IS 2-P and IS 2-A in Fig. 3 ). The fact that P and A no longer share the same information allow for A being better informed about about A than P. 2. As P no longer has full information about the set of feasible actions, we endow her with the ability to either search locally (exploitation of the known action space) or globally (exploration outside of the known action space) for actions which she wants A to carry out (March, 1991) .
Sophistication of IS 2-P and IS 2-A in the agent-based model variant. Our operationalization of information asymmetry is in line with the previous literature: Rajan and Saouma (2006) , for example, argue that the extent of information asymmetry is influenced by the choice of the internal accounting system. We take up on this argumentation and set up the model in the following way: While A can oversee the entire action space using his private IS 2-A, we model P to be able to oversee only a fraction of A as a consequence of the sophistication of her private IS 2-P. A low (high) level of sophistication of IS 2-P, thus, indicates that P has information about a relatively small (large) fraction of A. 
Formalization of the agent-based model variant
In the agent-based representation 4 of the hidden-action model we indicate time periods by subscript t = {1, ..., T } and the sequence of events within one timestep t by subscript τ. Figure   3 Please be aware that our adaptation blurs the line between two types of principal agent models: As outlined above, in the standard hidden action model all information except the effort a exerted by A are available for both P and A. In the hidden-information scenario, P and A share all information except for some observations which only A has made. Arrow (1985) argues that the observations (which lead to private information for A), for example, relate to possibilities of production which are not available for P. This argumentation can be directly related to our operationalization of the sophistication IS which provides information about the set of feasible actions: An increase (decrease) in the amount of A's private information (as a consequence of observations) leads to A being better informed about the set of feasible actions A, which can be translated into a low (high) level of sophistication of the internal information system. 4 We follow an approach introduced in Guerrero and Axtell (2011) and Leitner and Behrens (2015) to transfer closedform mathematical models into agent-based models. In order to build a simulator from the model described in Sec. 3.2 we use Mathworks R Matlab.
8 4 schematically represents the agent-based model and also indicates the information systems which P and A use during the different steps τ.
Characteristics of P, A, and the environment. We follow the LEN framework (see Lambert, 2001 ) and characterize the (risk-neutral) principal by the utility function
where x t denotes the outcome and s t stands for A's compensation in t. We model A as being characterized by the productivity ρ, denote A's productive effort in t by a t , and formalize outcome x t in period t by
In line with the LEN framework, the exogenous factors θ t follow a normal distribution, θ t ∼ N(µ, σ) and A's compensation s t is given by a linear sharing rule s(x t , p t ) = x t · p t , where p t ∈ [0, 1]. As in the standard hidden-action model (Holmström, 1979) , P aims at maximizing her utility subject to the participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint (cf. Sec.
2.1):
In order to do so, we allow the principal to adapt the parameterization of the sharing rule, i.e. the premium parameter p t , over time. The (risk-averse) agent is characterized by the CARA utility function
where η represents the agent's Arrow-Pratt measure of risk-aversion (Pratt, 1975) .
Information about the action space from IS 2-P and IS 2-A. In Sec. 3.1.2 we introduce information asymmetry regarding the set of feasible actions, which results in P only having information about a fraction of this set. This hinders P from finding the optimal parameterization of the sharing rule, p t , immediately -in contrast to the standard model which suggests that P sets the premium parameter p t so that A has incentives to exert the optimal effort level (cf. Sec. 2.1 and Eq. 6 below). As a consequence, P has to search for this effort level: In order to do so, P has the option to either exploit the fraction of the action space which is available for her (local search) or to explore the action space outside of the known area (global search) (cf. March, 1991) . P selects her search strategy in τ = 0 in periods t = 2, ..., T and, according to this strategy, uses her IS 2-P to perform either a global or a local search for effort levels on which she will base the contract (cf. τ = 0 in Fig. 4) . 5 In order to assure the existence of a solution to P's decision problem, it is necessary to set boundaries for the space of effort levels in t. We identify the lower boundary by the participation constraint, E(U A (s t , a t ) ≥ U, and the upper boundary by the incentive compatibility constraint, a t ∈ argmax a t ∈A t E(U A (s t , a t )) (cf. Sec. 2.1 and also Holmström, 1979) . It is important to notice that both boundaries are endogenous: They include an expectation about the environmental variable, as s t is based on the outcome x t (cf. Eq. 2). Thus, changes in the state of information about the environment (via learning in τ = 7, see below) might lead to changes in the boundaries of the action space A t . P uses her IS 1-P to retrieve information about the environment. P's IS for external information (IS 1-P). We denote the information which P retrieves from IS 1-P by the vectorΘ t . As discussed above, P's selection of a search strategy also depends on her state of information about the environment, i.e., the information which she retrieves from IS 1-P in τ = 0 (cf. Fig. 4 ). The length ofΘ t is defined by parameter m, which also stands for the sophistication of IS 1-P. A low level of sophistication indicates that only very recent information can be retrieved from IS 1-P, while a high level of sophistication means that information from a larger number of past periods is available for P. 6 A higher value of m, thus, indicates that the principal is better informed about the environment, as more historical information is used to compute P's expectation about the environment.
Endogenous threshold to trigger P's search strategies. As the information sources for P's decision for a search strategy are now defined (IS 1-P and IS 2-P), we can focus on her decision rule: P's decision to perform either a local or a global search (cf. March, 1991) is based on (i) P's estimated exogenous factor in t − 1 and (ii) a propensity to innovate δ ∈ [0, 1]. 7 As explained above, the principal retrieves the (i) estimation of the exogenous factorθ t−1 from IS 1-P in τ = 0. The way P estimatedθ t−1 in t−1 is formalized in Eq. 8 below. The (ii) propensity to innovate represents P's tendency to search either locally or globally, where a lower (higher) value decreases (increases) P's tendency to search globally. Using δ, an exploration-threshold κ t for timestep t can be computed as follows:
where σ(·) and µ(·) represent the standard deviation and the mean, respectively. Ifθ t−1 > κ t (θ t−1 < κ t ) P performs a global (local) search.
Endogenous boundaries of P's exploration and exploitation spaces. The principal now has selected her search strategy for period t. In order to carry out the search for candidates for the optimal effort level, the search spaces in which P performs her search need to be defined. The search space for a local (global) search is referred to as exploitation (exploration) space. Please recall that the set of feasible actions is bounded by the incentive compatibility and the participation constraints. The search spaces can be defined as follows:
• The exploitation space is defined as a fraction of the entire search space in t, and is a consequence in the sophistication of P's IS 2-P. We denote the sophistication of IS 2-P by parameter q, which defines the exploitation space in t as the fraction 1/q of the entire action space A t . We model the exploitation space to be equally distributed around the effort level on which P has based her computation of the premium parameter in the previous period, a t−1 , and refer toã t−1 as the 'status-quo effort level'.
• The exploration space is the area outside of the exploration space but inside the boundaries of A t .
The search spaces are schematically illustrated in Fig. 5 . Once the search strategy is settled, the principal randomly discovers 2 alternative and uniformly distributed effort levels in the search space. They will be evaluated in the next step.
P's evaluation of effort levels. P evaluates the newly discovered effort levels together with the status-quo effort level with respect to increases in expected utility (based on the utility function in Eq. 1) in timestep τ = 1 (cf. Fig. 4) . 8 We denote the value maximizing effort level in t from P's point of view byã t .
9 Please notice that the fact that the principal evaluates all candidates for the optimal effort in t on the basis of Eq. 1, requires P to build an expectation about the environment. She retrieves this expectation from her IS 1-P in τ = 1 (cf. Fig. 4 ):
Recall that parameter m indicates the sophistication of IS 1-P. The expected outcome from P's point of view, using value-maximizing effort levelã t can, thus, be formalized byx t =ã t · ρ + E P (θ t ).
The contract. Now that the principal has decided for an desired effort levelã t for period t, she can move on with setting up the contract. In order to do so, P computes the optimal premiumlevel in t in step τ = 2 according to
wheres t =x t · p. She, then, designs the contract and offers the contract to A, who decides whether or not to accept it in τ = 3. In order to compute the premium level p t , the principal uses information about the environment provided by IS 1-P and information about feasible actions provided by IS 2-P (cf. τ = 2 in Fig. 4) . The agent uses IS 1-A and IS 2-A for his decision of whether to accept the contract (cf. τ = 3 in Fig. 4 ).
A's IS for external information (IS 1-A) and his decision for an effort level. In case the agent accepts the contract, he exerts effort a t = max a t ∈A t U A (s t , a) in τ = 4. In order to find the effortlevel a t , A retrieves information about the action space A t from IS 2-A and information about the environment from IS 1-A (cf. τ = 4 in Fig. 4) . The decision rule reflects that the agent has information about the entire action space A t . In order to decide for an effort level, A builds an expectation about the exogenous factor in t. In order to do so, he retrieves his observations of realized exogenous factors, θ t , from IS 1-A and computes his expectation according to Figure 5 : Schematic representation of the endogenous boundaries of the action space (via the participation constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint), the definition of P's search spaces (exploration and exploitation space), and the interrelation between time-steps (indicated by dashed lines). The figure illustrates the case of exploration, in which the principal searches globally for candidates for the optimal effort level in t.
As for IS 1-P, parameter m stands for the number of past observations of θ τ , which can be retrieved from the IS and, thus, indicates the sophistication level IS 1-A.
Realization of the outcome and P's and A's utilities. After productive effort was exerted in τ = 4 and the exogenous factor realized in τ = 5, the outcome, x t = a t · ρ + θ t , realizes in τ = 6, and the utilities for the principal and the agent realize (cf. Eqs. 1 and 3).
P's estimation and A's observation of the environment. In τ = 7, A observes the realization of the exogenous factor in t, θ t , and stores this observation in his IS 1-A. The principal can only observe x t using IS 3. Based on this information she estimates the exogenous factor in t according toθ
and storesθ t in her IS 1-P. 10 Finally,ã t is carried over to period t + 1 as 'status-quo effort level'.
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This sequence explained above and depicted in Fig. 4 gets repeated T times.
Key parameters in the agent-based model
Parameters related to P. In addition to the utility function given in Eq. 1, P is characterized by a propensity to innovate (δ) which represents P's tendency to perform a local or global search, 10 Please notice that, as long as only one piece of information is unavailable,ã t and a t perfectly coincide and, thus, the principal can estimate the realization of the exogenous factor without error.
11 If the status-quo effort level is located outside the feasible region, the principal is forced to carry out a global search for alternative effort-levels.
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respectively (see Eq. 4 and adjacent paragraphs). With respect to the propensity to innovate, our analysis includes three different types of principals: First, an exploitation prone principal, who is characterized by a tendency toward local search (δ = 0.25). Second, an indifferent principal, who assigns equal probabilities to local and global search (δ = 0.5). Third, an exploration-prone principal, who is characterized by tendency towards global search (δ = 0.75).
Parameters related to A. Following the LEN framework (Lambert, 2001 ), the agent is characterized by a CARA utility function (cf. Eq. 3). We set A's Arrow-Pratt measure, η, equal to 0.5. In addition, A is characterized by a measure for productivity, which we set to ρ = 50.
Parameters related to the environment. The LEN framework assumes environmental variables to follow a normal distribution (Lambert, 2001 ). In our analysis we set the mean of the distribution of environmental variables equal to zero and consider four levels of environmental turbulence, which we operationalize by altering the distribution's standard deviation, σ: We set the standard deviation relative to the optimal outcome, x * , computed by using actual parameter settings and the second-best solution of the standard hidden action model, and consider a total of four cases ranging from of a relatively stable environment (σ = 0.05x * ) to relatively turbulent environments (σ = 0.65x * ).
Parameters related to ISs. For P's and A's external information systems (IS 1-P and IS 1-A, respectively), our analysis covers three levels of sophistication. Recall that the sophistication of these ISs is formalized by parameter m (see Eq. 5 for IS 1-P and Eq. 7 for IS 1-A). We set m = 1 and m = 3 for a low and medium level of sophistication, respectively. For highly sophisticated ISs we set m = ∞. The sophistication of P's internal information system IS 2-P is captured by parameter q, which identifies the fraction 1/q of the set of feasible actions which is available for P. As discussed in Sec. 3.1.2, q is also a proxy for the extent of information asymmetry (regarding the action space) between P and A. Our analysis includes three sophistication levels of IS 2-P: We set q = {3, 5, 10} for a high, medium, and low level of sophistication, respectively.
Global parameters. The possible combinations of the parameters which are subject to variation lead to a total number of 3 × 4 × 3 × 3 = 108 scenarios. For each scenario R = 700 simulation runs are performed, whereby the analysis focuses on the first 20 time periods, T = 20.
Results of the simulation study
4.1. Effects of the level IS sophistication on the shape performance over time Scenarios. The first part of the analysis provides insights into the effects of the sophistication of the information systems employed within the contractual relationship between P and A on the level of performance obtained. In order to do so, this section presents results for the following parameter settings:
1. The sophistication level m of the external information systems IS 1-P and IS 1-A are varied. We present results for 3 sophistication levels: ISs which provide poor (m = 1), medium (m = 3), and good information (m = ∞). Please notice that m does not vary between P and A. 2. The sophistication level 1/q of P's internal information system IS 2-P is varied. The scenarios cover cases in which the IS 2-P provides poor (1/q = 1/10), medium (1/q = 1/5), and good information (1/q = 1/3). 14 3. P's propensity to innovate is set to a medium level, δ = 0.5. This parameter setting results in P assigning equal probabilities to exploration and exploitation, while searching for candidates for the optimal effort level in t. 4. We present results for the two extreme cases of low (σ = 0.05x * ) and high (σ = 0.65x * ) environmental uncertainty.
This section particularly discusses cases in which m = {1, 3, ∞} and 1/q = 1/10 (cf. Fig. 6 ), and 1/q = {1/10, 1/5, 1/3} and m = 1 (cf. Fig. 7) . The results for all parameter combinations are presented in Fig. A.10 in Appendix A.
Performance indicator. For every timestep t, we report the averaged normalized effort level carried out by A as performance measure. For timestep (t ∈ T ) and every simulation run (r ∈ R) we track the level of effort a tr exerted by the agent, and normalize it by the optimal level of effort a * . The optimal effort level results from the second-best solution suggested by the standard hidden-action model (Holmström, 1979) . The reported performance indicator is formalized bỹ
Results on the sophistication of IS 1-P and IS 1-A. The results on the sophistication of P's and A's systems for information about the environment are presented in Fig. 6 . For this analysis, we investigate variations of IS 1-P and IS 1-A as described above, and keep the sophistication of the principal's IS 2-P constant at 1/q = 1/10. Each subplot in Fig. 6 presents results for one investigated sophistication level of IS 1-P and IS 1-A. For each scenario, the subplots report the averaged normalized effort level introduced in Eq. 9. For scenarios with low environmental uncertainty (represented by triangles in Fig. 6 ), the results indicate, that increasing the sophistication of IS 1-P and IS 1-A-and thereby increasing the quality of information about the organization's environment-significantly increases the slope of the performance curves. Thus, effort for better information about the environment appears to pay-off almost immediately in such scenarios. In addition to the slopes of the performance curves, the performances at the end of the observation period (i.e., after 20 periods) increase with the level of IS sophistication, too: While for the case of poor information about the environment around 0.74 of the performance suggested by the standard hidden action model can be achieved after 20 periods (see the subtop plot in Fig. 6 ), increasing the sophistication so that good information is provided, leads to a final performance of almost 0.95 (see the bottom subplot in Fig. 6 ). The described patterns can also be observed for situations in which P's internal IS 2-A has higher sophistication levels: It is, however, less pronounced the higher the sophistication of IS 2-P is (see Fig. A .10 in Appendix A).
As soon as we switch to scenarios with high environmental uncertainty (represented by black diamonds in Fig. 6 ), similar shapes of the performance curves emerge: For the case of poor external information, for example, performance increases only in the first 2 periods to around 0.68, before it remains on this level until the end of the observation period. In scenarios with good information about the environment, performance increases in the first 11 periods to around 0.87 and then remains stable until period 20. From the results we can draw the conclusion that higher sophistication levels of the IS for external information lead to (i) longer time spans in which performance increases, but (ii) the slopes of the performance curves in the first few periods are not affected. Consequently, final performances increase with the quality of the provided 15 Figure 6 : Effects of sophistication of P's and A's information systems for external information (IS 1-P and IS 1-A) on performance for different levels of environmental uncertainty. Averaged normalized effort levels are reported as performance measure (cf. Eq. 9). The sophistication of P's information system for internal information (IS 2-P) is set to 1/q = 1/10. Triangles ( ) represent low environmental uncertainty (σ = 0.05x * ), black diamonds ( ) represent high environmental uncertainty (σ = 0.65x * ). Shaded areas indicate confidence intervals for α = 0.01.
information. The same pattern emerges for situations with higher sophistication levels of P's IS 2-P (cf. Fig. A .10 in Appendix A)
Results on the sophistication of IS 2-P. We depict the performance curves for variations in the sophistication level of P's IS for internal information IS 2-P in Fig. 7 , whereby each of the 3 subplots presents results for one of the investigated sophistication levels. We keep the sophistication levels of IS 1-P and IS 1-A constant at m = 1. For scenarios in which environmental uncertainty is low (σ = 0.05x * , indicated by triangles in Fig.7) , our results suggest that increasing the sophistication of P's internal IS 2-P significantly increases the slope of the performance curve. Performance, thus, increases much faster in the first few periods. The final performance achieved after 20 periods is, however, only marginally affected: The final performance for the case of poor internal information (1/q = 1/10) amounts to around 0.71 (see the right subplot in Fig. 7) . Increasing the sophistication of IS 2-P to 1/q = 1/3 only leads to a marginal increase, so that a final performance of around 0.82 can be achieved. For scenarios with a high sophistication of P's and A's information system for environmental information, the pattern is similar, but the increase in the slopes of the performance curves is less pronounced (cf Fig. A .10 in Appendix A).
A totally different pattern emerges in situations in which environmental uncertainty is high (σ = 0.65x * , indicated by black triangles in Fig. 7 ): Irrespective of the sophistication level of IS 2-P, performance immediately reaches a level of around 0.71. From period t = 2 onwards, there are-more or less-no significant changes in this performance level. A similar behavior can be observed for situations in which P and A are better informed about the environment (see Fig. A .10 in Appendix A). This is a remarkable and counter-intuitive result: The results suggest that-at least for the first few periods-a significantly higher level of performance can be achieved in turbulent environments, as compared to stable environments.This finding might be explained by the pressure to be innovative, which turbulent environments pose on the principal (Mendes et al., 2016) . The time span in which this result can be observed is critically shaped by the sophistication of P's internal information system: For 1/q = 1/10 (1/q = 1/3) the performance observed in stable environments exceeds the performance in turbulent environments after 10 (4) periods.
Discussion and policy reflection. The results provide support for intuition that coping with environmental turbulence is more successful when the quality information about the nature of the environment is improved (Raghunathan, 1999) . In this sense, the results are in line with prior research in the tradition of the task-technology-model (Goodhue and Thompson, 1995) : This line of research indicates that the relation between environmental uncertainty and task characteristics affects the satisfaction of the user with the data provided by ISs. This level of satisfaction, then, critically shapes the success of organizational ISs (Karimi et al., 2004; Schäffer and Steiners, 2005; Petter et al., 2013 ). In the model used in this paper, a higher sophistication of the ISs for environmental information (IS 1-P and IS 1-A) and the internal IS (IS 2-P) provides more complete information, which results in 'better' decisions.
12 A higher sophistication of our modeled ISs can, thus, be interpreted as a higher task-technology fit. Figure 7 : Effects of sophistication of P's information system for internal information (IS 2-P) on performance for different levels of environmental uncertainty. Averaged normalized effort levels are reported as performance measure (cf. Eq. 9). The sophistication of A's and P's information systems for external information (IS 1-P and IS 1-A) is set to m = 1. Triangles ( ) represent low environmental uncertainty (σ = 0.05x * ), black diamonds ( ) represent high environmental uncertainty (σ = 0.65x * ). Shaded areas indicate confidence intervals for α = 0.01.
The results suggest that increasing the performance of the internal IS 2-P does not pay-off in turbulent environment: This is an unexpected finding which put calls for more sophisticated IS designs (e.g. Karimi et al., 2004) into perspective. Our results suggest that turbulent environments put a certain pressure to be innovative on decision makers, which is why performance increases immediately in the first few periods. Further performance increases can, then, only be achieved by improving the quality of information about the environment (IS 1-P and IS 1-A), which is why efforts to increase the sophistication of the internal IS 2-P prove to be ineffective.
The results presented so far suggest to differentiate the investment decisions regarding the sophistication of organizational ISs according to the degree of environmental uncertainty. If environmental uncertainty is low, enhancing the sophistication of external ISs (IS 1-P and IS 1-A) as well as internal IS 2-P increases the performance obtained: Investments in either direction appear to be beneficial. In contrast, when environmental uncertainty is high, investing into an improved internal IS 2-P appears to be ineffective: In such situations, the priority should rather be given to improving the quality of external information (provided by IS 1-P and IS 1-A).
Effectiveness of search strategies for different levels of IS sophistication
Scenarios. This part of the analysis focuses not only on variations in the sophistication of the ISs employed during P's and A's decision making processes, but also takes P's innovation propensity into account. The considered parameter setting is the following: presented in this section cover situations in which P has a tendency for either exploration (δ = 0.75) or exploitation (δ = 0.25). 4. We present results for 4 levels of environmental uncertainty: In addition to the two 'extreme' cases of low (σ = 0.05x * ) and high (σ = 0.65x * ) environmental uncertainty which were also included in the analysis in Sec. 4.1, we add two cased in with intermediate environmental turbulence, in which we set σ = 0.25x * and σ = 0.45x * .
As in Sec. 4.1, the discussion focuses on cases for in which m = {1, 3, ∞} and 1/q = 1/10 (cf. Fig. 8 ), and 1/q = {1/10, 1/5, 1/3} and m = 1 (cf. Fig. 9 ) in this section and add results for the remaining parameter combinations in B.11 in Appendix B.
Performance indicator. The performance measure used for the analysis in this section is based on the level of effort exerted by A. We, however, no longer present the averaged normalized effort levelp t and the performance curves over time (as done in Figs. 6 and 7), but condense performance curves to the Manhattan distance d, which here represents the distance between the averaged normalized effort levelp t and the optimal effort level x * over time. This allows us to present one performance measure per scenario, which can be formalized by
where t = 1, ..., T represents time steps, andp t stands for the averaged normalized effort level in period t (cf. Eq. 9).
Results on the sophistication of IS 1-P and IS 1-A. Results for scenarios in which the sophistication levels of IS 1-P and IS 1-A for external information are varied are presented in Fig. 8 . Each subplot presents the results for one of the investigated sophistication levels, and depicts contours resulting from the condensed performance measure introduced in Eq. 10. We keep the sophistication level of P's IS for internal information IS 2-P constant at m = 1 for this part of the analysis. For the case of a low level of IS sophistication (m = 1) (i.e., the top subplot in Fig. 8 ), the largest distance between the achieved and the optimal performance can be observed for situations with relatively stable environments. Intuition, however, suggests that organizations in stable environments achieve higher levels of performance. This finding can be explained by pressure to be innovative, which turbulent environments pose on organizations in this setup (cf. also Fig. 6 and the discussion in Sec. 4.1): This pressure leads to behavior that appears to offset the disadvantages of high turbulence. As environmental turbulence increases, organizations are forced into innovative behavior and the distance between achieved and optimal performance decreases significantly. It is, however, surprising that P's tendency to perform either exploration or exploitation appears not to affect the level of achieved performances (which is indicated by nearly horizontal contours, see the top subplot of Fig. 8 ).
As soon as we switch to scenarios with medium (m = 3) and high sophistication levels (m = ∞) of the ISs for external information (IS 1-P and IS 1-A), we can observe that a different pattern emerges. First, the largest distance between the achieved and the optimal performances can no longer be observed in stable but in turbulent environments. This finding is in line with the intuition that there is a negative relation between environmental turbulence and performance. Second, we can see that the contours are no longer nearly horizontal but their slope increases with the quality of the information provided by P's and A's information systems for external information. This change in the pattern of contours indicates that the decision whether to perform 19 Contours are based on Manhattan distances (cf. Eq. 10) between averaged normalized effort levels (introduced in Eq. 9) and optimal performances x * . The sophistication of P's information system for internal information (IS 2-P) is set to 1/q = 1/10. exploitation or exploration becomes particularly critical, when the involved parties are wellinformed about the environment. In addition to the changes in the pattern, it can be observed that the distance between the achieved and the optimal performance decreases significantly with increases in sophistication of P's Is 2-P: While for stable environments (σ = 0.05x * ), indifferent principals P (δ = 0.5), and poor external information (m = 1) the Manhattan distance is around −7. This distance reduces to around −3.15 and −2.95 for medium (m = 3) and good (m = ∞) information, respectively. The marginal change in performance increase, thus, reduces with higher levels of IS sophistication. The same observations can be made for cases with a medium (1/q = 1/5) and high (1/q = 1/3) level of sophistication for IS 2-P (cf. Fig. B .11 in Appendix B). Figure 9 : Effects of sophistication of P's information system for internal information (IS 2-P) on performance. Contours are based on from Manhattan distances (cf. Eq. 10) between averaged normalized effort levels (introduced in Eq. 9) and optimal performances x * . The sophistication of P's and A's information systems for external information (IS 1-P and IS 1-A) is set to m = 1.
Results on the sophistication of IS 2-P. Figure 9 presents results from scenarios with variations in the sophistication level of P's internal IS 2-P. For the ISs for external information, we fix m = 1 for this part of the analysis. As discussed above, for the scenarios with a low sophistication level of IS 2-P (1/q = 1/10), the largest distance between the achieved performances and the optimal performance can be observed in stable environments, and the horizontal contours indicate that P's tendency for search strategies does not affect performance.
13 An increase in the sophistication level of P's IS for external information so that medium (1/q = 1/5) and good information (1/q = 1/3) is provided for decision making purposes, only leads to slight changes in the observed pattern: First, the largest values for the distance from the achieved to the optimal performance shifts into the direction of more turbulent environments. The largest distances can, however, be observed for intermediate levels of environmental turbulence. This is surprising as one would expect the largest Manhattan distances in scenarios with the highest level of environmental turbulence. Second, for all sophistication levels of IS 2-P we can observe horizontal contours: This indicates that, irrespective of the quality of internal information, P's search strategies do not affect performance, as long as the sophistication of the IS for external information is m = 1. For higher sophistication levels of the ISs for external information (IS 1-P and IS 1-A) it can, however, be observed that a higher tendency for exploration leads to slightly better performances (cf. Fig. B .11 in Appendix B).
Discussion and policy reflection. This section does not take a snapshot of one time period or analyze performance curves over time but provides a condensed measure for the efficiency of organizational search strategies and sophistication levels of information systems for time periods. From that perspective, the results presented here indicate that the intuition that it is harder for organizations to achieve a high performance in turbulent environments is only true if decision makers are well informed about the environment (i.e, in situations in which IS 1-P and IS 1-A provide medium or good information). In situations in which the principal and the agent only have poor information about the environment, there appears to be a pressure to be innovative in terms of carrying out tasks. This leads to an immediate boost in performance, so that-over the entire observation period-the distance between the achieved and the optimal performance decreases. This finding is in line with previous research: Eisenhardt (1989b) and Alexiev et al. (2016) , for example, argue that increased innovativeness is a common response of organizations to turbulent environments when information quality is poor. This is exactly what we observe for situations in which the principal and the agent only have limited information about the environment. In addition, our results show that this pressure does not exist in stable environments, which is why performance increases at a much slower pace. In addition, we analyze the effect of the search strategy's impact on performance: Auh and Menguc (2005) argue that whether exploration or exploitation is the superior search strategy depends on the type of organization, which, in their case is either defender or prospector. We show that as long as information about the environment is poor, the choice of the search strategy in fact does not matter. With an increase in quality of information about the environment, exploration becomes significantly superior to exploitation. For the sophistication of the principal's information system for information about the action space, the results indicate that investments into better information quality only lead to very marginal increases of performance and no chances in the above discussed patterns. Thus, from a policy perspective, the findings presented here suggest a prioritization of ways to spend an organization's resources: Every effort should be made to build an information system which provides good information about the environment before tackling the question of whether to develop new ways to carry out specific tasks.
Summary and conclusive remarks
The standard hidden action model (Holmström, 1979) comprises some rather 'heroic' assumptions about the availability of information and individual behavior. In this paper, we put a particular focus on the assumptions regarding the information which is accessible for both the principal and the agent. We relax selected assumptions and, by doing so, shift the focus from the decision-influencing role to the decision-facilitating role of information. For this purpose, we employ an approach for transferring closed-form mathematical models into agent-based models (Guerrero and Axtell, 2011; Leitner and Behrens, 2015) , which allows to make less restrictive assumptions.
We limit the principal's and the agent's information about the environment in which the organization operates but endow them with the ability to learn about the environment over time. Both the principal and the agent store their learned information in an information system. In addition, we add information asymmetry regarding the options available for the agent to carry 22 out the task which the principal delegates to him: The principal is no longer fully informed about all feasible options but is endowed with search strategies to discover new options (March, 1991) . This information asymmetry between the principal and the agent is operationalized by granting them access to two different information systems for this type of information. We also investigate different levels of information system sophistication and analyze the impact on performance.
The results of our simulation study generate some key insights into the dynamics of delegation relationships with hidden action: First, our results provide evidence for the intuition that coping with environmental turbulence is more successful when the quality of information about the nature of the environment is improved. We also observe, that turbulent environments appear to put a pressure to be innovative on decision makers, which results in almost 'immediate' performance increases. Marginal changes in performance, however, decrease very fast, so that no further performance increases can be observed after only very few periods. Second, the results indicate that increasing the quality of internal information about feasible ways to carry out tasks does significantly affect the levels of achieved performances. Third, the results show that the choice of organizational search strategy (exploration or exploitation) affects performances only if decision makers are well informed about the environment. For the case of a poor quality of information about the environment, the employed search strategy does not significantly affect the level of achieved performance.
Our research is, of course, not without its limitations. First, we carry over some assumptions regarding the principal and the agent from principal-agent theory, which are also rather 'heroic'. These assumptions cover, for example, the individual utility maximizing behavior or the availability of information about the agent's characteristics. Future research might address these assumptions and assess their impact on the applicability of incentive mechanisms provided by principal-agent theory. Second, the agent is modeled to carry out the same task repeatedly; we, however, assume that there are no learning-curve effects. Making the agent's productivity an endogenous variable might add further dynamics to the model. Third, we model situations in which no search costs occur for the exploration of the search space. Future research might also consider adding search costs. In addition, a promising line for future research might be to come up with alternative incentive schemes which are better suited for the application in the situations modeled in this paper. .11: Effect of P's search strategies on performances for different levels of sophistication of information systems for internal and external information. Contours are based on from Manhattan distances (cf. Eq. 10) between averaged normalized effort levels (introduced in Eq. 9) and optimal performances x * . The dotted and dashed lines indicate the parts of the figure already presented in Figs. 8 and 9, respectively.
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